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Abstract
Brown and Lawrence: One year shy of the ﬁftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board
of Education, the justices issued another equality ruling that is also likely to be-
come an historical landmark. In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court invalidated a state
law that criminalized same-sex sodomy. This essay contrasts these two historic
rulings along several dimensions, with the aim of shedding light on how Supreme
CourtjusticesdecidecasesandhowCourtdecisionsinﬂuencesocialreformmove-
ments. The six dimensions along which I compare and contrast these decisions
are: (1) the ways in which both cases were hard for several of the justices; (2) how
the Court decisions ﬁt within the respective movements for social reform (i.e., was
the Court playing the role of vanguard or laggard?); (3) how the respective deci-
sions ﬁt within the spectrum of issues involving race and sexual orientation (i.e.,
was the Court in Brown and Lawrence tackling issues where opinion was most
likely to be with or against the Court?); (4) how and why the Court in both cases
desperately evaded the marriage issue; (5) the consequences of both rulings (and,
more speciﬁcally, the backlash effects they entailed); (6) the extent to which the






One year shy of the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education,
1 the justices 
issued another equality ruling that is also likely to become an historical landmark.
2  In Lawrence 
v. Texas,
3 the Court invalidated a state law that criminalized same-sex sodomy.  This essay 
contrasts these two historic rulings along several dimensions, with the aim of shedding light on 
how Supreme Court justices decide cases and how Court decisions influence social reform 
movements.
1 James Monroe Distinguished Professor of Law, Albert C. Tate, Jr., Research Professor, 
and Professor of History, University of Virginia.  I am grateful to Jim Ryan for comments on an 
earlier draft.  I also benefitted from the insightful comments of students at the University of 
Virginia School of Law, where I presented an earlier version of this essay at a forum sponsored 
by the American Constitution Society and the Lambda Law Alliance.  I dedicate this essay to the 
memory of my mother, Muriel Klarman (1929-2004). 
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
3 See Evan Thomas, The War Over Gay Marriage, Newsweek, July 7, 2003, p.38 
(quoting legal scholar David Garrow calling Lawrence, along with Brown, “one of the two most 
important opinions of the last 100 years”). 
4 539 U.S. __ (2003).
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I. Why Brown and Lawrence were Hard Cases
Most people today would be surprised to learn that Brown was a hard case for the 
justices.  If state-mandated segregation in public schools is not unconstitutional, what is?  That 
the ruling in Brown was unanimous, moreover, suggests that the justices found the case to be 
easy.  Yet appearances can be deceptive.  In fact, the justices were at first deeply divided on how 
to resolve Brown.
5
In a memorandum to the files that he dictated the day Brown was decided, Justice 
William O. Douglas observed that a vote taken after the case was first argued in 1952 would 
have been "five to four in favor of the constitutionality of segregation in the public schools.”
6
Justice Felix Frankfurter's head count was only slightly different: He reported that a vote taken at 
that time would have been five to four to invalidate  segregation, with the majority writing 
several opinions.
7
Brown was difficult for many of the justices because it posed a conflict between their 
legal views and their personal values.  The sources of constitutional interpretation to which they 
ordinarily looked for guidance–text, original understanding, precedent, and custom–indicated 
5 For a more complete discussion of the justices’ internal deliberations in Brown, see 
Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle 
for Racial Equality 292-312 (2004).
6 Douglas, memorandum for the file, Segregation Cases, 17 May 1954, Box 1149, 
Douglas Papers, Library of Congress.
7 Frankfurter to Reed, 20 May 1954, Reed Papers, University of Kentucky.
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that school segregation was permissible.  By contrast, most of the justices privately condemned 
segregation, which Justice Black called “Hitler’s creed.”
8  Their quandary was how to reconcile 
their legal and moral views.
Frankfurter’s preferred approach to adjudication required that he separate his personal 
views from the law.  He preached that judges must decide cases based upon “the compulsions of 
governing legal principles,”
9 not “the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment.”
10   In a 
memorandum he wrote in 1940, Frankfurter noted that “[n]o duty of judges is more important 
nor more difficult to discharge than that of guarding against reading their personal and debatable 
opinions into the case.”
11
That Frankfurter abhorred racial segregation cannot be doubted; his personal behavior 
clearly demonstrated his egalitarian commitments.  In the 1930s he had served on the legal 
committee of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and in 
8 Del Dickson, ed., The Supreme Court in Conference (1940-1985): The Private 
Discussions Behind Nearly 300 Supreme Court Decisions 639 (2001) (reproducing conference 
discussion in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, Apr. 8, 1950).
9 Quoted in Melvin I. Urofsky, Division and Discord: The Supreme Court Under 
Stone and Vinson, 1941-1953, at 130 (1997).
10 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
11 Urofsky, supra note __, at 109 n. 112.  This memo was written in conjunction with the 
first flag-salute case, Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
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1948 he had hired the Court’s first black law clerk, William Coleman.
12  Nonetheless, he insisted 
that his personal views were of limited relevance to the legal question of whether segregation 
was constitutional: “However passionately any of us may hold egalitarian views, however 
fiercely any of us may believe that such a policy of segregation . . . is both unjust and 
shortsighted[, h]e travels outside his judicial authority if for this private reason alone he declares 
[it] unconstitutional.”
13  The Court could invalidate segregation, Frankfurter believed, only if it 
was legally as well as morally objectionable. 
Yet Frankfurter had difficulty finding a compelling legal argument for striking down 
segregation.  His law clerk, Alexander Bickel, spent a summer reading the legislative history of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and he reported to Frankfurter that it was “impossible” to conclude 
that its supporters had intended or even foreseen the abolition of school segregation.
14  To be 
sure, Frankfurter believed that the meaning of constitutional concepts can change over time,
15
but as he and his colleagues deliberated, public schools in twenty-one states and the District of 
12 Melvin I. Urofsky, Felix Frankfurter: Judicial Restraint and Individual Liberties 
128-29 (1991); Urofsky, supra note __, at 260. 
13 Frankfurter, memorandum (first draft), undated, 1, Frankfurter Papers, microfilm 
edition, part 2, reel 4, frame 378 (University Publications of America 1986).
14 Alexander M. Bickel to Frankfurter, 22 Aug. 1953, Frankfurter Papers, part 2, reel 4, 
frames 212-14.
15 Urofsky, Supreme Court Under Stone and Vinson, supra note __, at 217 - 18, 222. 
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Columbia were still segregated.  He could thus hardly maintain that evolving social standards 
condemned the practice.  Furthermore, judicial precedent, which Frankfurter called “the most 
influential factor in giving a society coherence and continuity,”
16 strongly supported it.  Of forty-
four challenges to school segregation adjudicated by state appellate and federal courts between 
1865 and 1935, not one had succeeded.
17  Indeed, on the basis of legislative history and 
precedent, Frankfurter had to concede that “Plessy is right.”
18
Brown presented a similar dilemma for Justice Robert H. Jackson, who also found 
segregation anathema.  In a 1950 letter, Jackson, who had left the Court during the 1945-1946 
term to prosecute Nazis at Nuremberg, wrote to a friend: “You and I have seen the terrible 
consequences of racial hatred in Germany.  We can have no sympathy with racial conceits which 
underlie segregation policies.”
19  Yet, like Frankfurter, Jackson thought that judges were obliged 
to separate their personal views from the law, and he was loathe to overrule precedent.
20
16 Mary Frances Berry, Stability, Security, and Continuity: Mr. Justice Burton and 
Decision Making in the Supreme Court 1945-1958, at 142 (1978).
17 Note, Constitutionality of Educational Segregation, 17 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 208, 214 
n. 20 (1949). 
18 Douglas conference notes, Briggs v. Elliott, 12 Dec. 1953, case file: Segregation Cases, 
Box 1149, Douglas Papers.
19 Jackson to Charles Fairman, 13 March 1950, Fairman file, Box 12, Jackson Papers.
20 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters’ Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 589-95 (1944) 
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Jackson revealed his internal struggles in a draft concurring opinion that began: 
“Decision of these cases would be simple if our personal opinion that school segregation is 
morally, economically or politically indefensible made it legally so.”
21  But because Jackson 
believed that judges must subordinate their personal preferences to the law, this consideration 
was irrelevant.  When he turned to the question of whether existing law condemned segregation, 
he had difficulty answering in the affirmative: 
Layman as well as lawyer must query how it is that the Constitution this morning forbids 
what for three-quarters of a century it has tolerated or approved. . . . Convenient as it 
would be to reach an opposite conclusion, I simply cannot find in the conventional 
material of constitutional interpretation any justification for saying that in maintaining 
segregated schools any state or the District of Columbia can be judicially decreed, up to 
the date of this decision, to have violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
22
That the nine justices who initially considered Brown would be uneasy about invalidating 
(Jackson, J., dissenting); Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 403 (1943); Gregory S. Chernack,  
The Clash of Two Worlds: Justice Robert H. Jackson, Institutional Pragmatism, and Brown, 72 
Temple L. Rev. 51, 52 (1999); Dwight J. Simpson, Robert H. Jackson and the Doctrine of 
Judicial Restraint, 3 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 325, 326-29, 338-41 (1956).
21 Jackson draft concurrence, School Segregation Cases, 15 March 1954, p.1, case file: 
segregation cases, Box 184, Jackson Papers. 
22 Id. at 5, 10. 
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segregation is unsurprising.  All of them had been appointed by Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and Harry S Truman on the assumption that they supported, as Jackson put it, “the doctrine on 
which the Roosevelt fight against the old court was based–in part, that it had expanded the 
Fourteenth Amendment to take an unjustified judicial control over social and economic 
affairs.”
23  For most of their professional lives, these men had criticized untethered judicial 
activism as undemocratic–the invalidation of the popular will by unelected officeholders who 
were inscribing their social and economic biases onto the Constitution.  This is how all nine of 
them understood the Lochner
24 era, when the Court had invalidated protective labor legislation 
on a thin constitutional basis.  The question in Brown, as Jackson’s law clerk William H. 
Rehnquist noted, was whether invalidating school segregation would eliminate any distinction 
between this Court and its predecessor, except for “the kinds of litigants it favors and the kinds 
of special claims it protects.”
25
Thus, several justices wondered whether the Court was the right institution to forbid 
segregation.  Several expressed views similar to Vinson’s: If segregation was to be condemned, 
“it would be better if [Congress] would act.”
26 Jackson cautioned that “[h]owever desirable it 
23 Jackson to Fairman, supra note __.  
24 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
25 WHR (William H. Rehnquist), “A Random Thought on the Segregation Cases,” Box 
184, Jackson Papers.
26 Burton conference notes, Segregation Cases, 13 Dec. 1952, Box 244, Burton Papers, 
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may be to abolish educational segregation, we cannot, with a proper sense of responsibility, 
ignore the question whether the use of judicial office to initiate law reforms that cannot get 
enough national public support to put them through Congress, is our own constitutional 
function.”
27  If the Court had to decide the question, Jackson lamented, “then representative 
government has failed.”
28
Until the current justices’ conference notes and memoranda are made public, one cannot 
be certain as to what internal conflicts they may have experienced in Lawrence.  Still, it is likely 
that at least some of the justices in the majority found Lawrence hard–and for pretty much the 
same reasons that several justices were conflicted over Brown. 
Lawrence, like  Brown , required the justices to overturn a precedent–Bowers v. 
Hardwick
29–and a fairly recent one at that.   Three of the six justices who voted to invalidate the 
Texas same-sex sodomy statute–Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter–
had co-authored the plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey,
30 which stressed the importance of precedent to the rule of law: “Liberty finds no refuge 
Library of Congress.
27 Jackson to Fairman, supra note __.
28 Douglas conference notes, Briggs v. Elliott, 12 Dec. 1953, case file: Segregation Cases, 
Box 1149, Douglas Papers.
29 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
30 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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in a jurisprudence of doubt.”
31  As Justice Antonin Scalia pointed out in his Lawrence dissent,
32
the treatments of precedent in Casey and Lawrence are–to put it mildly–in some tension with one 
another.  
Moreover, Lawrence, like  Brown , adopts an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
that significantly departs from its original understanding.  The thirty-ninth Congress was no more 
committed to protecting gay rights than it was to barring school segregation.
33
Further, because Justices Kennedy and O’Connor generally disfavor identifying new 
fundamental rights or suspect classes,
34 both of their opinions in Lawrence rule the Texas statute 
31 Id. at 844.
32 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of being 
“manipulative in invoking the doctrine” of stare decisis and criticizing its failure to distinguish 
Casey’s treatment of precedent). 
33 On the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment with regard to school 
segregation, see Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A 
Response to Professor McConnell, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1881 (1995).
34 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736-37 (1997) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (concluding that there is no “generalized right to ‘commit suicide’ but leaving open 
“the question whether suffering patients have a constitutionally cognizable interest in obtaining 
relief from the suffering that they may experience in the last days of their lives”); Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating under minimum rationality review Colorado’s 
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deficient under minimum rationality review.  That conclusion is difficult to justify, given the 
extreme deference the Court has traditionally shown when applying that standard of review.
35
Until 1961 every state in the nation had a law forbidding same-sex sodomy.
36  It strains credulity 
to suggest that all those states were acting irrationally.
37
Finally, Kennedy and O’Connor reveal discomfort with the stated rationales underlying 
their opinions by insisting on limiting their reach by fiat.  Kennedy insists that the liberty 
protected by the Due Process Clause “presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of 
constitutional amendment denying protected status to homosexuals and declining to rule that 
homosexuality is a suspect status or that any fundamental right was implicated here); Plyler v. 
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 242-54 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by O’Connor) (denying that 
illegal aliens are a suspect class or that education is a fundamental right).
35 See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961) (noting that the Equal 
Protection Clause is “offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the 
achievement of the state’s objective”); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955) 
(applying an extremely deferential standard under minimum rationality review).
36 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193.
37 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for 
applying “an unheard-of form of rational-basis review”); id. at 2497 (accusing the majority of 
“having laid waste the foundations of our rational-basis jurisprudence”).  
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thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”
38  O’Connor both portrays the Texas 
statute as motivated by simple animus or hatred  and rejects “moral disapproval” as a legitimate 
state purpose.
39  Yet both justices caution that other laws disadvantaging gays and lesbians–for 
example, bans on same-sex marriage–would not necessarily be susceptible to those objections.
40
They offer no convincing bases for drawing a distinction, however, and Scalia powerfully 
charges in dissent that “only if one entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to 
do with the decisions of this Court” can such a distinction be maintained.
41
One cannot know for sure, but Lawrence probably presented the same conflict between 
law and personal values for Justices Kennedy and O’Connor that Brown did for Justices 
Frankfurter and Jackson.  Kennedy and O’Connor were likely offended by the criminal 
prosecution of private, consensual, adult sexual activity; even Justice Thomas, who dissented, 
thought the statute “‘uncommonly silly.’”
42  Yet, these justices’ favored approaches to 
constitutional interpretation revealed no obvious legal flaws in the Texas statute.  
That the opinions in Brown and Lawrence rely partially on unconventional legal sources 
38 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475.
39 Id. at 2485-86 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
40 Id. at 2484; id. at 2487-88 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
41 Id. at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 2498 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting)). 
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supports the notion that some of the justices found the cases difficult.  Brown’s famous footnote 
11 invoked social science evidence to show that racial segregation in grade school education 
generated feelings of inferiority among blacks.  The use of such evidence in a Supreme Court 
opinion was virtually unprecedented; the particular evidence invoked was deeply flawed; and the 
left-wing political credentials of some of the academic experts cited invited criticism from 
McCarthyites.
43  Justice Jackson himself disparaged the NAACP’s brief, which he said “starts 
and ends with sociology.”
44  Judge George Bell Timmerman of South Carolina, alluding to 
footnote 11, insisted that “[t]he judicial power of the United States . . . does not extend to the 
enforcement of Marxist socialism as interpreted by Myrdal, the Swedish Socialist.”
45  Why Chief 
Justice Earl Warren chose to insert the controversial social science evidence into the footnote is 
unclear,
46 but the NAACP relied on it in the litigation partly because the conventional sources of 
43 Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 150, 157-68 (1955); Herbert 
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 32-33 (1959); 
Sanjay Mody, Note, Brown, Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social Science and the 
Supreme Court’s Quest for Legitimacy, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 793, 801-09 (2002).  
44 Clark conference notes, Brown v. Board of Education, Box A27, Clark Papers, Tarlton 
Law Library, University of Texas.
45 Southern School News , Jan. 1958, p. 6. 
46 For some interesting speculation, see Mody, supra note __, at 814-28 (suggesting that 
the Brown Court relied on social science evidence to help legitimize a ruling that departed from 
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constitutional interpretation were so unsupportive of the challenge to school segregation.
Similarly in Lawrence, the majority opinion relies partly on an unorthodox source for 
interpreting the American constitution: a decision by the European Court of Human Rights.
47
For the justices to invoke a ruling from a foreign court as authority for interpreting of the U.S. 
Constitution is virtually unprecedented.  As Justice Scalia pointed out in his Lawrence dissent, it 
is also highly controversial.
48   Perhaps one can attribute such a reference to the effects of 
globalization; these days, the justices spend more time in other countries and interact more with 
foreign judges.  Alternatively, the invocation of a precedent from the European court may reflect 
the justices’ concern in Lawrence that the conventional sources of American constitutional law 
did not adequately support the result. 
II. Court as Vanguard or Laggard?
In both Brown and Lawrence, the justices overcame their ambivalence about reaching a 
politically attractive result that was difficult to justify legally.  How were they able to do so?  All 
the conventional approach to constitutional interpretation).
47 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2472 (2002) (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (1981) as refutation of “the premise in Bowers  that the claim put forward was insubstant ial 
in our Western civilization”); id. at 2483 (noting subsequent decisions by the European Court of 
Human Rights adhering to Dudgeon).
48 Id. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling the majority’s invocation of foreign 
precedents “[d]angerous dicta”). 
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judicial decision making involves extralegal, or “political” considerations, such as the judges’ 
personal values, social mores, and external political pressure.
49  But when the law–as reflected in 
text, original understanding, precedent, and custom–is clear, judges will generally follow it.  
In 1954 the law–as understood by most of the justices–was reasonably clear: Segregation 
was constitutional.  For the justices to reject a result so clearly indicated by the conventional 
legal sources suggests that they had very strong personal preferences to the contrary.
50  And so 
they did.  Although the Court had unanimously and casually endorsed public school segregation 
as recently as 1927,
51 by the early 1950s, the views of most of the justices reflected the dramatic 
popular changes in racial attitudes and practices that had resulted from World War II.
52  The 
ideology of the war was antifascist and prodemocratic, and the contribution of African-American 
soldiers was undeniable.  Upon their return to the South, thousands of black veterans tried to 
vote, many expressing the view of one such veteran that “after having been overseas fighting for 
49 For elaboration of this view of how judges decide cases, see Klarman, supra note __, at 
4-6, 446-54.
50 For a similar example of this phenomenon, see Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98.  See 
generally Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 
Calif. L. Rev. 1721 (2001).
51 Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
52 The following discussion is based on Klarman, supra note __, at 173-93 (citing relevant 
sources). 
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democracy, I thought that when we got back here we should enjoy a little of it.”
53  Thousands 
more joined the NAACP, and many became civil rights litigants.  Others helped launch a 
postwar social movement for racial justice.  
Other developments in the 1940s also fueled African-American progress.  Over the 
course of the decade, more than one and a half million southern blacks, pushed by changes in 
southern agriculture and pulled by wartime industrial demand, migrated to northern cities.  This 
mass relocation–from a region in which blacks were almost universally disfranchised to one in 
which they could vote nearly without restriction–greatly enhanced their political power; indeed, 
they became a key swing constituency in the North.  Other blacks migrated from farms to cities 
within the South, facilitating the creation of a black middle class that had the inclination, 
capacity, and opportunity to engage in organized social protest.  
The onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s created another impetus for racial reform.  In 
the ideological contest with communism, American democracy was on trial, and southern white 
supremacy was its greatest vulnerability.  The Justice Department’s brief in Brown, which urged 
the Court to invalidate school segregation, emphasized that “[r]acial discrimination furnishes 
grist for the Communist propaganda mills.”
54  After  Brown , supporters of the decision boasted 
53 Quoted in Robert J. Norrell, Reaping the Whirlwind: The Civil Rights Movement in 
Tuskegee 60-61 (1985).
54 Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae, Brown v. Board of Education, 6, in Philip 
B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper, eds., 49 Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme 
Court of the United States 121.
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that America’s leadership of the free world “now rests on a firmer basis”
55 and that American 
democracy had been “vindicat[ed] . . . in the eyes of the world.”
56
By the early 1950s such forces had produced concrete racial reforms.  In 1947, Jackie 
Robinson desegregated major league baseball.  In 1948, President Truman issued executive 
orders desegregating the federal military and civil service.  Dramatic changes in racial practices 
were occurring even in the South.  Black voter registration there increased from 3 percent in 
1940 to 20 percent in 1950.
57  Dozens of urban police forces in the South, including some in 
Mississippi, hired their first black officers.  Minor league baseball teams, even in such places as 
Montgomery and Birmingham, Alabama, signed their first black players.  Most southern states 
peacefully desegregated their graduate and professional schools under court order.  Blacks began 
serving again on southern juries.  In many southern states, the first blacks since Reconstruction 
were elected to urban political offices, and the walls of segregation were occasionally breached 
in public facilities and accommodations.
As they deliberated over Brown, the justices expressed astonishment at the extent of the 
55 Mark V. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme 
Court, 1936-1961, at 172-73 (1994).
56 Chicago Defender, 22 May 1954, p. 5.
57 David J. Garrow, Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, at 7 tbl. 1-1, 11 tbl. 1-2 (1978). 
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recent changes.  Sherman Minton detected “a different world today” with regard to race.
58
Frankfurter noted “the great changes in the relations between white and colored people since the 
first World War” and remarked that “the pace of progress has surprised even those most eager in 
its promotion.”
59  Jackson may have gone furthest, citing black advancement as a constitutional 
justification for eliminating segregation.  In his draft opinion he wrote that segregation “has 
outlived whatever justification it may have had . . . . Negro progress under segregation has been 
spectacular and, tested by the pace of history, his rise is one of the swiftest and most dramatic 
advances in the annals of man.”
60  Blacks had thus overcome the presumptions on which 
segregation was based. 
It was these sorts of changes--political, social, demographic, and ideological -- that made 
Brown possible.  Frankfurter later conceded that he would have voted to uphold public school 
segregation in the 1940s because “public opinion had not then crystallized against it.”
61  The 
58 Burton conference notes, School Segregation Cases, 12 Dec. 1953, Box 244, Burton 
Papers.
59 Frankfurter memorandum, n.d., p. 2, Frankfurter Papers, microfilm edition, part 2, reel 
4, frame 379.
60 Jackson draft concurrence, supra note __, at 1, 19-21. 
61 Quoted in Douglas memorandum, 25 Jan. 1960, reproduced in Melvin I. Urofsky, ed., 
The Douglas Letters: Selections from the Private Papers of Justice William O. Douglas 169 
(1987).
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justices in Brown did not think that they were creating a movement for racial reform; they 
understood that they were working with, not against, historical forces. 
Lawrence, like  Brown , came in the wake of extraordinary changes in attitudes and 
practices regarding homosexuality.  In 1986, Chief Justice Warren Burger in his concurring 
opinion in Bowers  recited Blackstone’s condemnation of homosexuality as an offense of “deeper 
malignity” than rape.
62  In the seventeen years between Bowers  and  Lawrence, public opinion 
went from opposing the legalization of homosexual relations by 55 percent to 33 percent to 
supporting legalization by 60 percent to 35 percent.
63  Many states, either through legislative or 
judicial action, nullified laws criminalizing same-sex sodomy.
64  Several states and scores of 
cities added protection for sexual orientation to their antidiscrimination laws.
65  Nearly two 
62 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
63 Public Opinion Online (May 20, 2003), accession # 0429847.  See also Paul. R. 
Brewer, The Shifting Foundations of Public Opinion About Gay Rights, 65 J. Pol. 1208, 1208-09 
(2003) (noting a substantial reduction in the 1990s in the percentage of Americans who regard 
same-sex relations as wrong). 
64 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gay Law: Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet 168 
(1999).
65 Eskridge, supra note __, at 130, 139, 233, 356-61 append. B; Barry A. Adam, The Rise 
of a Gay and Lesbian Movement 123 (1987). 
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hundred Fortune 500 companies extended job-related benefits to gay partners.
66  The Hawaii 
supreme court invalidated a ban on same-sex marriage,
67 and the Vermont Supreme Court ruled 
that same-sex couples must at least be permitted to form “civil unions.”
68  In the 1990s, hundreds 
of openly gay men and women were elected to public offices, and gays and lesbians entered 
mainstream culture on television, film, and music; in 1998, an openly gay man won a Pulitzer 
Prize for the first time.
69  In 2003 the Episcopalian Church ordained its first openly gay bishop.
70
Both Brown and Lawrence reflected more than they produced changes in social attitudes 
and practices.  This is not to suggest that the Court is a perfect mirror of society.  Indeed, the 
justices share certain characteristics that set them apart from average Americans: They are older, 
better-educated, and more affluent.
71  On some public policy disputes that become constitutional 
66 Thomas, supra note __ (noting the number of Fortune 500 companies offering benefits 
to gay partners rose from one in 1992 to 197 in 2003).
67 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P. 2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
68 Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194, 744 A.2d 864 (1999).
69 Craig A. Rimmerman, From Identity to Politics: The Lesbian and Gay Movements 
in the United States 1 (2002). 
70 See Laurie Goodstein, Openly Gay Man is Made a Bishop, New York Times, Nov. 3, 
2003, p. A1.
71 Michael J. Klarman, What’s So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
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issues, these characteristics correlate with certain views.  For example, better-educated, relatively 
affluent people are much more likely to favor abortion rights and to oppose school prayer than 
are average Americans.
72
Occasionally, the culturally elite values of the justices make them more receptive than the 
general population to social reform.  In 1954, opinion polls showed that nearly half of all 
Americans supported racial segregation in public schools, whereas college graduates condemned 
that practice by nearly three to one.
73  Reflecting the values of the cultural elite, the justices in 
Brown unanimously condemned public school segregation. 
Today, attitudes toward homosexuality strongly correlate with socioeconomic status:  
Better educated, affluent people are generally much more tolerant than are average Americans.
74
Yet, on this issue, another of the justices’ systemic biases has a partially offsetting effect: 
Attitudes toward homosexuality also strongly correlate with age: Older people are generally 
much less tolerant than are younger people.  For example, one recent opinion poll shows that 
respondents aged eighteen to twenty-nine favor legalization of “homosexual relations” by 58
percent to 39 percent, while those aged sixty-five and over oppose legalization by 61 percent to 
145, 189-91 (1998).
72 Id. at 190 n.245.
73 George H. Gallup, 2 The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971, at 1250 (1972).
74 See, e.g., Public Opinion Online (Aug. 22, 2000) (reporting a Roper poll finding that 
74 percent of respondents with postgraduate education would vote for a well-qualified 
homosexual for president but only 46 percent of high school dropouts would do so).
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24 percent.
75  On gay rights, then, one might have predicted that the Court would be less far in 
advance of public opinion than it had been on race.  This, in fact, has almost surely been the 
case.  The justices’ age bias may help explain why Bowers v. Hardwick was decided as it was 
and why the Court took so long to overrule it. 
The main point, though, is that neither Brown nor Lawrence created a new movement for 
social reform; both decisions supported movements that had already acquired significant 
momentum before their grievances reached the Supreme Court.
III.  Hierarchies of Preference
In at least one interesting and important way, Lawrence differs from Brown.  On subjects 
such as race and sexual orientation, public attitudes often vary across a range of issues.  Under 
Jim Crow, whites were generally more opposed to interracial marriage and the integration of 
grade schools than they were to desegregating transportation or permitting blacks to vote.
76
75 Katharine Q. Seelye & Janet Elder, Strong Support is Found for Ban on Gay Marriage, 
New York Times, Dec. 21, 2003 . See also NPR, Gay Marriage and Civil Unions (Dec. 24, 
2003) (noting that people in the age range 18-29 oppose gay marriage by 45 percent to 39 
percent, whereas people aged 64 and over oppose it by 75 percent to 18 percent); Public Opinion 
Online, supra note __ (reporting an opinion poll finding that 65 percent of people under age 29 
would vote for a qualified homosexual for president but only 39 percent of people age 70 and 
older). 
76 Gunnar Myrdal, 1 An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern 
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Similarly, heterosexuals today tend to be far more committed to preventing same-sex marriage 
than to barring same-sex “civil unions” or to permitting employers to discriminate based on 
sexual orientation.  Heterosexuals are least determined to retain criminal prohibitions on private, 
consensual, adult same-sex sodomy.
By the early 1950s, many southern cities had relaxed Jim Crow in public transportation, 
police department employment, athletic competitions, and voter registration.
77  Yet white 
southerners were more adamant about preserving school segregation, which lay near the top of 
the white-supremacist hierarchy of preferences.  Blacks, conversely, were often more interested 
in voting, ending police brutality, securing decent jobs, and receiving a fair share of public 
education funds than in desegregating grade schools.  These partially inverse hierarchies of 
preference among whites and blacks opened space for political negotiation (to the extent that 
blacks had the power to compel whites to bargain).  Brown mandated change in an area–grade 
school education–where whites were most resistant, thus virtually ensuring a backlash (as 
discussed below).  Had the Court first decided a case such as Gayle v. Browder,
78 desegregating 
local bus transportation, the reaction of white southerners would probably have been less 
vitriolic.  Indeed, southern whites had shown far greater restraint in response to earlier Court 
decisions invalidating the white primary and striking down segregation in graduate and 
Democracy 60-61 (1944).
77 See Klarman, supra note __, at 188-90.




By contrast, Lawrence dealt with an issue on which heterosexuals are most tolerant of 
change.  Whatever most Americans today think of gay marriage or gays openly serving in the 
military, few favor punishing the private sexual conduct of gays and lesbians.  As one social 
conservative put it after  Lawrence , “even most Christians believe that what is done in the privacy 
of one’s home is not the government’s business.”
80 In 1961 all fifty states punished same-sex 
sodomy; in 1986 only twenty-five did so; and only thirteen states did so at the time of Lawrence
(only four with statutes that were explicitly addressed to same-sex sodomy).
81  Even in those 
holdout states, actual prosecutions were almost unheard of.
82  Thus, Lawrence was about as 
(politically) easy a constitutional case as the Court ever confronts: The justices were asked to 
translate into constitutional law a social norm that commanded overwhelming popular support.
83
79 See Klarman, supra __, at 238-39, 254-55, 393.
80 Rosen, supra note __ (quoting Paul Weyrich).
81 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481; see also Dean E. Murphy, Gays Celebrate, and Plan 
Campaign for Broader Rights, New York Times, June 27, 2003, p.A20 (noting that in Harris 
County, Texas, Lawrence was the only person prosecuted for same-sex sodomy in at least 
twenty-two years).
82 Id.
83 Thomas, supra note __ (noting that the Court in Lawrence was “just catching up to 
public opinion”); Robin Finn, After Battling for Gay Rights, Time to Shift Energies, New York 
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Accordingly, they probably anticipated a placid response to their ruling, unlike in Brown, where 
the justices expected white southerners to respond with violence and school closures.
84
IV. Broader Implications–Evading the Marriage Issue
Brown and Lawrence are alike in that both opinions were consciously written narrowly. 
Brown was decided as an education case.  The Court emphasized that “education is perhaps the 
most important function of state and local governments”
85 and held only that “[s]eparate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal.”
86  The justices deliberately refrained from 
announcing a presumptive ban on all racial classifications.  One principal reason they did so was 
to avoid calling into question the constitutionality of state laws barring interracial marriage.  
Many southern whites had charged that the real goal of the NAACP’s school 
desegregation campaign was “to open the bedroom doors of our white women to the Negro 
men”
87 and “to mongrelize the white race.”
88  For the justices to strike down antimiscegenation 
Times, July 8, 2003, p.B2 (quoting Ruth E. Harlow, legal director of the Lambda Legal Defense 
and Education Fund, observing that in Lawrence, “the majority of the court caught up to the vast 
majority of Americans”). 
84 Klarman, supra note __, at 294. 
85 Brown, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (emphasis added).
86 Id. at 495 (emphasis added).
87 Southern School News, Jan. 1955, p. 2. 
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laws so soon after Brown might have appeared to validate such suspicions.  Moreover, opinion 
polls in the 1950s revealed that over 90 percent of whites–even outside of the South–opposed 
interracial marriage.
89  During oral argument in one of the original school segregation cases, 
Justice Frankfurter had seemed relieved when counsel denied that barring school segregation 
would necessarily invalidate antimiscegenation laws.
90  Frankfurter later explained that one 
reason that Brown was written as it was–emphasizing the importance of public education rather 
than condemning all racial classifications–was to avoid the miscegenation issue.
91
However, the justices were quickly confronted with cases that seemed to require them to 
acknowledge that Brown’s logic extended beyond the sphere of education.  In 1955-1956 the 
Court faced challenges to state-mandated segregation of public beaches, golf courses, and local 
transportation.  Because Brown had emphasized the importance of public education rather than 
questioning the validity of all racial classifications, invalidating segregation in these post-Brown
88 Southern School News, Nov. 1955, p. 9.  For statements to similar effect, see Judge 
Walter Jones, I Speak for the White Race, Montgomery Advertiser, 4 March 1957, NAACP, 
part 20, reel 4, frame 436; Brady, Black Monday, 64-67; Talmadge, You and Segregation, 42-
44.
89 2 Gallup, supra note __, at 1572. 
90 Oral argument in Bolling v. Sharpe, 10-11, reproduced in 49 Kurland & Casper, eds., 
supra note __, at 405-06.  
91 Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge 664-70 (1994).
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cases seemed to require additional explanation.  Yet the justices provided none, instead issuing 
cursory per curiam opinions that merely cited Brown.
92  Those legal academics most committed 
to “reasoned elaboration” in judicial decision making were virtually apoplectic.
93
Yet even these post-Brown per curiams stopped short of invalidating antimiscegenation 
laws.  The justices had an opportunity to determine the constitutionality of such laws, but they 
refused to take it, even though avoiding it required them to act disingenuously.  In Naim v. 
Naim,
94 a Chinese man and a white woman had tried to circumvent Virginia’s ban on interracial 
marriage by wedding in North Carolina.  After returning to Virginia, the woman later sought an 
annulment under the antimiscegenation law, which her husband then challenged as 
unconstitutional. The trial court granted the annulment, and the Virginia Court of Appeals 
affirmed, sustaining the statute.
This was the last case the justices wished to see on their docket in 1955, but it seemed to 
fall within the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction.  Today the justices have almost complete 
discretion over their docket, but in the mid-1950s federal law still required them to grant appeals 
92 E.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 
(1955); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955). 
93 See Henry Hart & Albert Sachs, The Legal Process: Basic Problems for the Making 
and Application of Law 164-70 (1994); Wechsler, supra note __, at 11-12, 15-17.
94 Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955).
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when state courts had rejected federal claims that were not “insubstantial.”
95  To say that 
antimiscegenation laws posed an insubstantial constitutional question would have been absurd. 
The importance was “obvious,” law clerk William A. Norris (later a judge on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit) told Justice Douglas, and “[f]ailure to decide the case would blur 
any distinction remaining between certiorari and appeal.”
96  Justice Harold Burton’s clerk agreed 
that the Court could not honestly avoid the case, though he would have preferred to “give the 
present fire a chance to burn down.”
97
Both clerks underestimated the desperation and creativity of the justices.  Though several 
justices wished to take jurisdiction, others searched for an escape route.  Justice Tom Clark 
suggested one: The plaintiff should be estopped from invoking the antimiscegenation law 
because she knew of the defendant’s race when they married and deliberately evaded the 
95 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1952). 
96 WAN (William Norris) to Douglas, certiorari memorandum, Naim v. Naim, 24 Oct. 
1955, office memos, nos. 350-399, Box 1164, Douglas Papers; WAN to Douglas, supplemental 
memorandum, Naim v. Naim, undated, ibid.  See also Gregory Michael Dorr, Principled 
Expediency: Eugenics, Naim v. Naim and the Supreme Court, 42 Am. J. Leg. Hist. 119, 149-50 
(1998) (noting other similar statements).
97 Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decision Making in the Supreme 
Court, 1948-1958, 68 Geo. L.J. 1, 63 (1979). 
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statutory prohibition.
98  Burton suggested another: They could dismiss the case on the 
independent state-law ground that Virginia required residents to marry within the state–a plainly 
erroneous reading of Virginia law.
Of all the justices, Frankfurter felt the gravest anxiety about the case.  If this had been a 
certiorari petition, he would have rejected it, as “due consideration of important public 
consequences is relevant to the exercise of discretion in passing on such petitions.”
99  (Indeed, in 
1954 the Court had denied certiorari in another southern miscegenation case.
100)  But Naim was 
an appeal, and Frankfurter admitted that the challenge to antimiscegenation laws “cannot be 
rejected as frivolous.”  Still, the “moral considerations” for dismissing the appeal “far outweigh 
the technical considerations in noting jurisdiction.”  To thrust the miscegenation issue into “the 
vortex of the present disquietude” would risk “thwarting or seriously handicapping the 
enforcement of [Brown].”  Frankfurter’s proposed solution, which the justices adopted, was to 
remand the case to the Virginia Court of Appeals with instructions to return it to the trial court 
for further proceedings in order to clarify the parties’ relationship to the commonwealth, which 
was said to be uncertain from the record; clarification might obviate the need to resolve the 
98 Clark to Jackson, handwritten note, undated, Box A47, Clark Papers. 
99 Frankfurter memorandum, Naim v. Naim, Frankfurter Papers, part 2, reel 17, frs. 588-
90; Frankfurter to Clark, handwritten note, undated, Box A47, Clark papers; Hutchinson, 
“Unanimity and Desegregation,” 64-66; Dorr, Naim v. Naim, 149-50, 153-54, 156.
100 Jackson v. Alabama, 72 So. 2d 116 (Ala.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 888 (1954). 
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constitutional question.
101  On remand, the Virginia jurists refused to comply with the Court’s 
instructions; they denied that the record was unclear and that state law permitted returning final 
decisions to trial courts in order to gather additional evidence.
102  Virginia newspapers treated the 
state court’s response as an instance of nullification.
103
The petitioner then filed a motion to recall the Court’s mandate and to set the case for 
argument.  Douglas’s law clerk, Norris, now identified three options that were available.
104  The 
Court could summarily vacate the state judgment to “punish” Virginia for its disobedience. 
Norris thought that this solution would be “intemperate and would unnecessarily increase the 
friction between this Court and the southern state courts.”  Second, the justices could circumvent 
the recalcitrant state high court and remand the case directly to the trial court.  Finally, they 
could take the appeal, which would be a “tacit admission that the Court’s original remand was 
unnecessary.”  Norris favored the last option and warned that “[i]t will begin to look obvious if 
the case is not taken that the Court is trying to run away from its obligation to decide the case.”
Norris failed even to imagine the option chosen by a majority–dismissing the appeal on 
the ground that the Virginia court’s response “leaves the case devoid of a properly presented 
101 Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955).
102 Naim, 90 S.E. 2d 849 (Va. 1956).
103 Dorr, supra note __, at 156.
104 WAN to Douglas, certiorari memorandum, Naim v. Naim, 1 March 1956, case file: 
office memos, numbers 350-399, Box 1164, Douglas Papers.
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federal question.”
105  A majority of the justices apparently preferred being humiliated at the 
hands of truculent state jurists to further stoking the fires of racial controversy ignited by Brown.  
Once again, those academic commentators most committed to “reasoned elaboration” in judicial 
decision making scored the Court for taking action that was “wholly without basis in the law.”
106
Not until the 1960s would the Court announce a presumptive ban on racial classifications,
107 and 
not until 1967 would it strike down antimiscegenation laws.
108
In Lawrence, the justices likewise strained to avoid resolving the same-sex marriage 
issue.  Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion emphasizes that the case involves “the most private 
human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.”
109  He also 
carefully notes that the case “does not involve whether government must give formal recognition 
105 Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
106 Paul Bator, et al., Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 
660-62 (2
nd ed., 1973); Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the ‘Passive Virtues’–A Comment on 
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 11-12 (1964).  But see 
Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 174 (1962).
107 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192-93, 196 (1964); id. at 197 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
108 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
109 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
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to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”
110  Justice O’Connor’s concurring 
opinion similarly stresses that just because “this law as applied to private, consensual conduct is 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause does not mean that other laws distinguishing 
between heterosexuals and homosexuals would similarly fail under rational basis review.”
111
Further, she notes that in support of its ban on same-sex sodomy, Texas failed to assert a 
legitimate interest, “such as national security or preserving the traditional institution of 
marriage.”
112  O’Connor even goes so far as to stipulate, without explication, that “other reasons 
exist to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded 
group.”
113  She could hardly have been clearer in signaling her unwillingness to commit to 
invalidating bans on openly gay military service and same-sex marriage. 
That Kennedy and O’Connor would go to such lengths to deny that Lawrence has 
implications for same-sex marriage is not surprising.  Much as at the time of Brown a majority of 
Americans opposed public school segregation but overwhelmingly supported antimiscegenation 
laws, so at the time of Lawrence public opinion opposed criminal prosecution of private gay sex 
but supported by a two-to-one margin laws restricting marriage to unions between men and 
women.
110 Id. at 2484.
111 Id. at 2467 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
112 Id. at 2488. 
113 Id.
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Justice O’Connor’s constitutional jurisprudence–and, perhaps to a somewhat lesser 
extent, Justice Kennedy’s–reveals a strong sensitivity to public opinion.  On the question of 
whether it is constitutional to execute the mentally retarded, O’Connor and Kennedy were 
apparently more influenced than other justices by the number of states that had recently 
forbidden the practice.
114  They seem more comfortable than the other conservative justices in 
using the Constitution to suppress outliers but less comfortable than some of the liberals in using 
the Constitution to resist majority opinion.  Likewise, on abortion and affirmative action, 
O’Connor’s apparent shifts over time toward a more liberal position can be plausibly attributed 
to changes in public opinion.
115  No Court on which O’Connor is the median justice will 
invalidate any time soon bans on same-sex marriage.  
Yet just as Br own  led inexorably, albeit gradually, to a presumptive judicial ban on all 
114 Compare Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 310, 314-15 (2002) (O’Connor and 
Kennedy joining the majority opinion holding unconstitutional the execution of the mentally 
retarded, partly on the basis of “the dramatic shift in the legislative landscape that has occurred 
in the . . . 13 years [since Penry]) with Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (O’Connor and 
Kennedy joining a majority opinion rejecting a constitutional challenge to the execution of the 
mentally retarded). 
115  On abortion, compare Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion) with Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 452 U.S.
450 (1989).  On affirmative action, compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. __ (2003) with 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).  
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racial classifications, so is Lawrence likely to lead eventually to a presumptive judicial ban on all 
classifications based on sexual orientation.  Whereas Kennedy and O’Connor insist that 
Lawrence has no necessary implications for same-sex marriage, Justice Scalia’s dissent rightly 
observes that they offer no basis–other than what he calls a “bald unreasoned disclaimer”–for 
distinguishing that issue.
116 Lawrence denies that “moral disapproval” of homosexuality is a 
legitimate state interest.  It is difficult, however, to identify a state interest other than moral 
disapproval that would convincingly justify banning same-sex marriage.  The recent decision by 
the Massachusetts Supreme Court invalidating such bans confirms the difficulty of identifying 
plausible state interests other than moral disapproval that would justify treating gays and 
straights differently.
117
Scalia is surely right as a doctrinal matter but just as surely wrong as a practical matter 
(as he undoubtedly appreciates).  Five members of this Court are not about to strike down any 
time soon bans on same-sex marriage–not when public opinion strongly supports such laws.  
Figuring out how the Court in such a case would distinguish Lawrence is an interesting question.  
Perhaps the Court would simply refuse to take such the case, much as the justices after Brown
managed to evade the antimiscegenation issue in Naim.  Alternatively, the justices might adopt 
116 123 S. Ct. at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2496 (noting that Justice 
O’Connor’s equal-protection rationale “leaves on pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting 
marriage to same-sex couples”). 
117 Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (2003). 
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the unorthodox strategy pursued by Justice Kennedy in Romer v. Evans
118 and pretend that 
Lawrence never happened, much as Romer fails even to acknowledge the existence of  Bowers .  
Regardless of whether they choose to ignore or to distinguish Lawrence, Justices Kennedy and 
O’Connor are not about to create a constitutional right for gays to marry  in light of 
contemporary public opinion.  
Yet the Court’s refusal after Brown to extend its antidiscrimination rationale to the 
logical conclusion of invalidating antimiscegenation laws lasted only as long as public opinion 
remained overwhelmingly hostile to interracial marriage.  The same is likely to be true for same-
sex marriage.  If public opinion on that issue becomes more tolerant–as I suggest below is almost 
certain to happen–then the Court is likely to extend Lawrence’s condemnation of “moral 
disapproval” of homosexuality and invalidate bans on same-sex marriage.  The critical 
development in both arenas will have been changes in public opinion, not the inexorable 
doctrinal logic of the earlier decision. 
V. Consequences
Brown produced very little school desegregation in the South for nearly a decade, as 
white southerners launched a campaign of massive resistance that proved largely successful.
119
118 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
119 On massive resistance, see generally Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive 
Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950s (1969); Neil R. McMillen, The 
Citizens' Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction (1971).  On the lack 
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But Brown had other, less direct consequences.  The Court’s ruling dramatically raised the 
salience of the segregation issue, forcing many people to take a position for the first time.
120
Brown was also enormously symbolic to African Americans, many of whom regarded it as the 
greatest victory for their race since the Emancipation Proclamation.
121  In addition, Brown
inspired southern blacks to file petitions and lawsuits challenging school segregation, including 
in dozens of localities in the Deep South, where such challenges would otherwise have been 
inconceivable in the mid-1950s.
122
Yet Brown may have mattered even more in another way.  By the early 1960s, a powerful 
direct-action protest movement had exploded in the South, featuring sit-ins, freedom rides, and 
street demonstrations.  Brown helped to ensure that when such demonstrations came, politicians 
such as Bull Connor and George Wallace were there to meet them with violence.  That brutality, 
when vividly communicated to national audiences by television, mobilized public opinion in 
support of transformative civil rights legislation.
123
In the short term, Brown retarded progressive racial reform in the South.  With school 
of desegregation for the first decade, see Klarman, supra note __, at 344-63.
120 Klarman, supra note __, at 364-65. 
121 Id. at 369. 
122 Id. at 368-69.
123 For a more detailed exegesis of this backlash argument, see Klarman, supra note __, at 
385-442. 
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desegregation lurking in the background, whites in the Deep South suddenly could no longer 
tolerate black voting.  Significant postwar expansions of black suffrage in Mississippi, Alabama, 
and Louisiana were halted and then reversed.
124 Brown also retarded the pace of university 
desegregation, which had been proceeding slowly but surely under the Court’s 1950 ruling in 
Sweatt v. Painter.
125   The post-Brown backlash in the South also reversed progress in 
desegregating sporting competitions, including minor league baseball and intercollegiate football 
and basketball.
126  Even minor interracial courtesies and interactions that were uncontroversial 
before 1954 often had to be suspended in the post-Brown racial hysteria.  In 1959 Governor John 
Patterson of Alabama barred black marching bands from the inaugural parade, where they had 
previously been warmly received.
127   Since its founding in 1942, Koinonia Farm, an interracial 
religious cooperative in Americus, Georgia, had experienced little harassment, but after Brown
its products were boycotted and its roadside produce stands were shot at. Interracial unions that 
had thrived in the South for years self-destructed after Brown.
128
Most importantly, in the wake of Brown, political contests in southern states assumed a 
124 Id. at 392-93. 
125 339 U.S. 629 (1950). See Klarman, supra note __, at 393. 
126 Id. at 393-94. 
127 Southern School News , Feb. 1959, p. 16. 
128  Margaret Price, “Joint Interagency Fact Finding Project on Violence and 
Intimidation” (draft), pp. 51-52, in NAACP Papers, part 20, reel 11, frames 338, 388-89. 
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common pattern:  Candidates maneuvered against one another to occupy the most extreme point 
on the segregationist spectrum.  Racial moderates, who denounced diehard resistance to Brown,  
were labeled “double crossers,” “sugar-coated integrationists,” “cowards,” and “traitors.”
129
Most moderates either joined the segregationist bandwagon, or they were retired from service.  A 
Virginia politician observed that it “would be suicide to run on any other platform [than 
segregation].”
130  A liberal southern editor explained that “it takes guts not to come out for 
segregation every day.”
131
Although most southern politicians avoided explicit exhortations to violence, the 
extremist rhetoric they used probably encouraged it.  Governor Marvin Griffin of Georgia 
condemned violence but also insisted that “no true Southerner feels morally obliged to recognize 
the legality of this act of tyranny [Brown].”
132  Senator James Eastland of Mississippi cautioned 
that “[a]cts of violence and lawlessless have no place,” but only after he had incited his audience 
with reminders that “[t]here is no law that a free people must submit to a flagrant invasion of 
their personal liberty” and that “[n]o people in all the history of Government have been forced to 
129 Quoted in Klarman, supra note __, at 391. 
130 Southern School News , July 1957, p.3.
131 Quoted in, Stan Opotowsky, “Dixie Dynamite: The Inside Story of the White 
Citizens’ Councils” (Jan. 1957), p. 18, in NAACP Papers, part 20, reel 13, frames 670, 685.
132 Southern School News , Nov. 1954, p.10.  
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integrate against their will.”
133  Congressman James Davis of Georgia insisted that “[t]here is no 
place for violence or lawless acts,” but only after he had called Brown “a monumental fraud 
which is shocking, outrageous and reprehensible,” warned against “meekly accept[ing] this 
brazen usurpation of power,” and denied any obligation on “the people to bow the neck to this 
new form of tyranny.” 
134  These politicians either knew that such rhetoric was likely to incite 
violence, or they were criminally negligent for not knowing it.
The linkage between particular public officials who benefitted from the post-Brown
political backlash and the brutality that inspired civil rights legislation is compelling.  T. Eugene 
(“Bull”) Connor had been on the Birmingham City Commission since 1937.  But in the early 
1950s, civic leaders, who had come to regard him as an embarrassment because of his extremism 
and frequent brutality toward blacks, orchestrated his public humiliation through an illicit sexual 
encounter.  Connor retired from public life in 1953, and racial progress ensued in Birmingham, 
including the establishment of the first hospital for blacks, the desegregation of elevators in 
downtown office buildings, and serious efforts to desegregate the police force.
135
After Brown, Birmingham’s racial progress ground to a halt, and Connor resurrected his 
133 Sen. James Eastland, “The South Will Fight!,” Arkansas Faith (Dec. 1955), pp. 8-9, in 
NAACP Papers, part 20, reel 13, frames 303-04.
134 Speech of Rep. James C. Davis of Georgia, 31 March 1956, in Extension of Remarks 
of Rep. John Bell Williams, Congressional Record, 23 Apr. 1956, NAACP, part 20, reel 13, 
frames 346, 347, 351.
135 For this paragraph, see Klarman, supra note __, at 429-30 (citing relevant sources).
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political career.  In 1957 he regained his city commission seat, defeating an incumbent he 
attacked as weak on segregation.  In the late 1950s, a powerful Klan element wreaked havoc in 
Birmingham with a wave of unsolved bombings and brutality.  The police, under Connor’s 
control, declined to interfere.  Standing for reelection in 1961, Connor cultivated extremists by 
offering the Ku Klux Klan fifteen minutes of “open season” on the Freedom Riders as they rolled 
into town.  Connor won in a landslide.
136
In 1963 the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) was searching for a 
southern city with a police chief whose violent propensities could be counted on to produce 
televised scenes of police brutality against peaceful demonstrators that would shock the nation’s 
conscience.  They selected Birmingham because of Connor.  The strategy worked brilliantly, as 
Connor soon unleashed police dogs and fire hoses against the demonstrators, many of whom 
were children.  The national news media featured images of police dogs attacking unresisting 
demonstrators, including one that President John F. Kennedy reported made him sick.  Editorials 
condemned the violence as a national disgrace.  Citizens voiced their outrage and demanded that 
politicians take action to immediately end such savagery.  Within 10 weeks, spin-off 
demonstrations had spread to over 100 cities.
137
These televised scenes of brutality dramatically altered northern opinion on race and 
enabled passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  Opinion polls revealed that the percentage of 
Americans who deemed civil rights the nation’s most urgent issue rose from 4 percent before 
136 Id. at 430-31 (citing relevant sources). 
137 For this paragraph, see Klarman, supra note __, at 433-36 (citing relevant sources).
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Birmingham to 52 percent after.
138  Only after Birmingham did Kennedy announce on national 
television that civil rights was a “moral issue as old as the scriptures and . . . as clear as the 
American Constitution”
139 and propose landmark civil rights legislation that would end Jim 
Crow.
140
Even more than Connor, Governor George Wallace of Alabama personified the post-
Brown racial fanaticism of southern politics.  Early in his postwar political career, Wallace had 
been criticized as soft on segregation.  By the mid-1950s, though, Wallace had felt the shifting 
political winds and become an ardent segregationist.  In 1958, Wallace’s principal opponent in 
the Alabama governor’s race, state attorney general John Patterson, received an endorsement 
from the Ku Klux Klan.  Wallace criticized Patterson for not repudiating this endorsement, 
which unwittingly made him the candidate of moderation.  Patterson easily defeated Wallace, 
leaving the latter to ruminate that “no other son-of-a-bitch will ever out-nigger me again.”
141
Wallace made good on that promise in 1962, winning on a campaign promise of defying 
138 3 Gallup, supra note __, at 1812, 1842.
139 Quoted in Carl M. Brauer, John F. Kennedy and the Second Reconstruction 260 
(1977). 
140 For this paragraph, see Klarman, supra note __, at 435-36 (citing relevant sources). 
141 Quoted in Dan T. Carter, The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, The Origins of the 
New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics 96 (1995). For this paragraph 
generally, see Klarman, supra note __, at 399, 436-37 (citing relevant sources).  
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federal integration orders, “even to the point of standing at the school house door in person.”
142
He declared in his inaugural address: “In the name of the greatest people that have ever trod this 
earth, I draw the line in the dust and toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny and I say 
segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever.”
143
In the summer of 1963, Wallace fulfilled his campaign pledge to stand in the schoolhouse 
door at Tuscaloosa, physically blocking the university’s entrance before, in a carefully planned 
charade, stepping aside in face of superior federal force.  That September, Wallace used state 
troops to block the court-ordered desegregation of public schools in Birmingham, Mobile, and 
Tuskegee, and he encouraged local extremists to wage a boisterous campaign against 
desegregation.
144
Threatened with judicial contempt citations, Wallace eventually relented.  The schools 
desegregated, but within a week tragedy had struck.  Birmingham Klansmen, possibly inspired 
by the governor’s protestations that “I can’t fight federal bayonets with my bare hands,”
145
dynamited the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, killing four black schoolgirls.  Within hours of 
the bombing, two other black teenagers were killed.  It was the largest death toll of the civil 
142 Southern School News , Apr. 1962, pp. 3, 12.
143 Southern School News , Feb. 1963, p.10.
144 For this paragraph, see Klarman, supra note __, at 437 (citing relevant sources).
145 Quoted in Carter, supra note __, at 173. 
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rights era, and Wallace received much of the blame.
146
Most of the nation was appalled by the murder of innocent schoolchildren.  One week 
after the bombing, tens of thousands of Americans participated in memorial services and 
marches.  Northern whites wrote to the NAACP to join, to condemn, and to apologize.  A white 
lawyer from Los Angeles wrote that “[t]oday I am joining the NAACP; partly, I think, as a kind 
of apology for being caucasian, and for not being in Birmingham to lend my physical 
support.”
147  A white man from New Rochelle wrote: “How shall I start?  Perhaps to say that I 
am white, sorry, ashamed, and guilty. . . . Those who have said that all whites who, through 
hatred, intolerance, or just inaction are guilty are right.”
148  The NAACP urged its members to 
“flood Congress with letters in support of necessary civil rights legislation to curb such 
outrages.”
149
Early in 1965, the SCLC brought its voter registration campaign to Selma, Alabama, in 
search of another Birmingham-style victory.  King and his colleagues chose Selma partly 
because of the presence there of a law enforcement officer of Bull Connor-like proclivities.  
Dallas County Sheriff Jim Clark had a vicious temper, especially when it came to black people 
146 For this paragraph, see Klarman, supra note __, at 437-38 (citing relevant sources).
147 Donald B. Brown to Wilkins, 18 Sept. 1963, NAACP Papers, part 20, reel 3, fr. 941.
148 Robert E. Feir to Wilkins, 23 Sept. 1963, NAACP Papers, Part 20, reel 3, fr. 959.
149  NAACP press release, 21 Sept. 1963, NAACP Papers, part 20, reel 3, fr. 986.
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asserting their civil rights.
150
Selma proved another resounding success (albeit a tragic one) for the civil rights 
movement, as Clark could not restrain himself from brutalizing peaceful demonstrators.  The 
violence culminated in Bloody Sunday, March 7, 1965, when county and state law enforcement 
officers viciously assaulted marchers as they crossed the Edmund Pettus Bridge on the way to 
Montgomery.  Governor Wallace had promised that the march would be broken up by “whatever 
measures are necessary.”
151  That evening, ABC television interrupted its broadcast of Judgment 
at Nuremberg for a lengthy film report of peaceful demonstrators being assailed by stampeding 
horses, flailing clubs, and tear gas.
152
Most of the nation was repulsed by the ghastly scenes they had watched on television.  
Time reported that “[r]arely in history has public opinion reacted so spontaneously and with such 
fury.”
153 Over the following week, huge sympathy demonstrations took place across the country, 
and hundreds of clergymen flocked to Selma to show their solidarity with King and his 
comrades.  American citizens demanded remedial action from their congressmen, scores of 
whom condemned the “deplorable” violence and the “shameful display” of Selma and endorsed 
150 For this paragraph, see Klarman, supra note __, at 440 (citing relevant sources).
151 Quoted in Stephen L. Longnecker, Selma’s Peacemaker: Ralph Smeltzer and Civil 
Rights Mediation 176 (1987). 
152 For this paragraph, see Klarman, supra note __, at 440-41 (citing relevant sources).
153 Time , 19 March 1965, pp. 23 -28.
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voting rights legislation.
154  On March 15, 1965, President Johnson proposed such legislation 
before a joint session of Congress.  Seventy million Americans watched on television as the 
president beseeched them to “overcome this crippling legacy of bigotry and injustice” and 
declared his faith that “we shall overcome.”
155
It was the brutalization of peaceful black demonstrators by white law enforcement 
officers in the South that repulsed national opinion and led directly to the passage of landmark 
civil rights legislation.  The post-Brown fanaticism of southern politics created a situation that 
was ripe for violence.  Much of that violence was encouraged, directly or indirectly, by extremist 
politicians, whom voters rewarded for the irresponsible rhetoric that fomented brutality.  By 
helping to lay bare the violence at the core of white supremacy, Brown accelerated its demise.
156
It is, of course, too soon to tell what the broader impact of Lawrence will be.  One might 
have predicted a fairly mild reaction to a ruling that invalidated criminal prohibitions on same-
sex sodomy–a decision that commanded broad support in public opinion.  Yet the reaction to 
154 111 Congressional Record 4984-89, 5014-15 (15 March 1964). 
155 “Special Message to the Congress: The American Promise” (15 March 1965), in
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book 1 
(Washington, D.C., 1966): 281, 284.  For this paragraph generally, see Klarman, supra note __, 
at 440-41 (citing relevant sources). 
156 See generally Klarman, supra note __, at 385-442 (describing Brown’s backlash, the 
violence it fostered, and the counterbacklash that violence incited). 
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Lawrence has been intense and acrimonious.
157  Apparently, both sides of the gay rights debate 
have appreciated that the decision will have little practical significance when considered 
narrowly, and they have accordingly shifted their attention to far more controversial issues like 
gay marriage.
158  Well-publicized developments in Canada during the last year–including both 
legislative and judicial recognition of gay marital rights–have further increased the salience of 
157 See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, How to Reignite the Culture Wars, New York Times 
Magazine, Sept. 7, 2003 (describing how social conservatives swiftly mobilized opposition to 
Lawrence); Thomas, supra note __ (describing conservative groups as “apoplectic” over 
Lawrence); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, White House Avoids Stand on Gay Marriage Measure, New 
York Times, July 2, 2003, p.A22 (ruling that conservatives were “outraged” over Lawrence).
158 Rosen, supra note __ (noting that liberal activists and social conservatives both 
thought that Lawrence “made it more likely that lower courts ill come to recognize a 
constitutional right to gay marriage”); Nancy Gibbs, A Yea for Gays; The Supreme Court Scraps 
Sodomy Laws, Setting Off a Hot Debate, Time, July 7, 2003, p.38 (noting that Lawrence has 
mobilized both gay-rights activists and Christian fundamentalists); William Safire, The Bedroom 
Door, New York Times, June 30, 2003, p.A21 (predicting, immediately after Lawrence, that 
gay-rights activists would turn same-sex marriage into a dominant political issue); Sarah 
Kershaw, Adversaries on Gay Rights Vow State-By-State Fight, New York Times, July 6, 2003, 
p.A8 (noting that in the wake of Lawrence, both sides in the gay-rights debate were “vowing an 
intense state-by - state fight over issues such as same-sex marriage”). 
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that issue.
159
A decision in the fall of 2003 by the Massachusetts Supreme Court that explicitly 
addressed gay marriage added fuel to the fiery debate sparked by Lawrence.  In Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health,
160 the court held that a ban on same-sex marriage was invalid 
under the equality provision of the Massachusetts constitution.  Almost immediately, social 
conservatives demanded a constitutional amendment forbidding same-sex marriage, and 
President George W. Bush later added his support.
161  A very similar ruling in 1993 by the 
159 See Halpern v. Toronto, 2003 W.L. 34950 (Ontario Ct. App.); Cohen, Dozens in 
Canada Follow Gay Couple’s Lead, Washington Post, June 12, 2003, p.A25; Clifford Krauss, 
Canadian Leaders Agree to Propose Gay Marriage Law, New York Times, June 18, 2003, 
p.A1.
160 798 N.E. 2d 941 (2003). 
161 See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller, Same-Sex Marriage: The President; Bush Backs Ban in 
Constitution on Gay Marriage, New York Times, Feb. 25, 2004, p. A1; David D. Kirkpatrick, 
Conservatives Using Issue of Gay Unions as a Rallying Tool, New York Times, Feb. 8, 2004, p.1 
(noting that the same-sex marriage issue is mobilizing social conservatives in a way that no other 
issue has done in the last several years); id. (quoting a leader of the Southern Baptist Convention: 
“I have never seen anything that has energized and provoked our grass roots like this issue 
[same-sex marriage], including Roe v. Wade”). 
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Hawaii Supreme Court
162 provoked a similar response; within a few years, more than thirty 
states (including Hawaii) and Congress had responded by passing Defense of Marriage Acts.
163
Court rulings like Brown and Goodridge produce political backlashes for three principal 
reasons: They raise the salience of an issue; they incite anger over “outside interference” or 
“judicial activism”; and they change the order in which social change would otherwise have 
occurred.  
Brown was harder to ignore than earlier changes in southern racial practices.  Most white 
southerners did not see black jurors or black police officers, who policed black neighborhoods 
only, and they would have been largely unaware of the dramatic increases in black voter 
registration that had occurred since World War II.  Even some instances of integration–such as 
on city buses or golf courses–would have gone unnoticed by many white southerners.
164  But 
they could not miss Brown, which received front-page coverage in virtually every newspaper in 
the country and was a constant topic of southern conversations.
165  A northern white visitor 
found after Brown that segregation “is the foremost preoccupation of the Southern mind. . . . [It] 
162 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P. 2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
163 These laws are collected in Eskridge, supra note __, at 362-72 append. B-3.  See also 
Rimmerman, supra note __, at 75 (describing an enormous conservative backlash against Baehr).
164 For examples, see Southern School News, May 1958, p. 5; Fairclough, Civil Rights 
Struggle in Louisiana, 153. 
165 Pettigrew, “Desegregation and its Chances for Success,” 341 table 3.
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intrudes into almost every conversation. It nags, it bothers and it will not be ignored.”
166  One 
white-supremacist leader credited the Court with “awaken[ing] us from a slumber of about 30 
years,”
167 and an Alabama public official noted that white southerners owed the justices “a debt 
of gratitude” for “caus[ing] us to become organized and unified.
168
Lawrence and, to an even greater extent, Goodridge, have dramatically raised the 
salience of gay-rights issues.  Many other reforms on issues of sexual orientation–repeal of 
criminal prohibitions on sodomy, expansion of partnership benefits, and enactment of statutory 
protections against discrimination in employment and public accommodations–have occurred 
without riveting public attention.
169  Since Goodridge, though, same-sex marriage has constantly 
captured front-page newspaper headlines, and the issue is certain to play a significant role in the 
2004 presidential campaign.
170 Lawrence and Goodridge have forced people who previously 
166 Hamilton Basso, letter to the editor, NYT, 10 Apr. 1955, p. 10E.
167 Southern School News , Apr. 1955, p. 3.
168 Southern School News , Nov. 1959, p. 16.
169 John Cloud, The Battle Over Gay Marriage,” Time, Feb. 16, 2004 (noting a dramatic 
expansion in partnership benefits over the last ten years).
170 See, e.g., James Dao, Legislators Push for State Action on Gay Marriage, New York 
Times, Feb. 27, 2004 (noting that the gay-marriage issue is “expected to resonate for months and 
months during the election season”); NPR, Morning Edition, Dec. 26, 2003 (noting that same-
sex marriage “will likely be one of the most contentious social issues in the 2004 races”); id. 
http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/uva_publiclaw/art449
had not paid much attention to gay-rights issues to notice what is happening and to form an 
opinion on it.  As one social conservative has observed, “the more people focus on [gay 
marriage], the less they support it.”
171  Another expressed hope that Goodridge “slapped 
American Christians in their face and woke them up.”
172
Second, judicial rulings such as Brown and Goodridge may mobilize greater resistance 
than reforms that take place through the legislature or with the acquiescence of other 
democratically run institutions.  Brown represented federal interference in southern race 
relations–something that white southerners, harboring deep historical resentments over 
Reconstruction, military rule, and the imposition of “carpetbagger” governments–could not 
easily tolerate.
173  Some earlier changes in racial practices–such as the hiring of black police 
(quoting Republican pollster Bill McInturff to the effect that Lawrence and Goodridge put the 
same-sex marriage issue “front and center of the 2004 debate”). 
171 Seelye & Elder, supra note __ (quoting Rev. Lou Sheldon, chairman of the Traditional 
Values Coalition); see also Lynn Vincent, Court’s Eye for the Married Guy, World Magazine, 
Dec. 6, 2003 (quoting a congressional representative who supports a federal constitutional 
amendment banning same-sex marriage: Until Goodridge, “a lot of people didn’t realize the 
gravity of the situation.  Sometimes it takes something like this to jolt people into action.”).
172 Vincent, supra note __. 
173 Jackson draft concurrence, supra note __, at 3 (noting that white southerners, 
“harbor[ing] in historical memory, with deep resentment, the program of reconstruction and the 
deep humiliation of carpetbag government imposed by conquest,” viscerally rejected outside 
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officers or the desegregation of minor league baseball teams–flowed from choices made by white 
southerners rather than from judicial decrees.  Other changes–such as increases in public 
spending on black schools and the growing number of blacks registered to vote–had been 
influenced by federal court decisions, but they still depended on choices made by southern 
whites.  Brown was different; it left southern whites no choice but to desegregate their schools. 
Accordingly, Brown was “viewed by many white Southerners as federal intervention designed to 
destroy their way of life.”
174
Goodridge, decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Court, cannot be seen as outside 
interference in the same way that Brown was regarded by white southerners.  However, because 
it was a decision made by judges, not popularly elected legislators, critics can deride it as a 
product of the arrogance of “activist judges” defying the will of the people.
175  This contrasts 
interference). 
174 Quoted in Stewart Burns, ed., Daybreak of Freedom: Montgomery Bus Boycott 208 
(1997) (quoting Bayard Rustin’s report on his visit to Montgomery during the bus boycott, 
March 21, 1956). 
175 See, e.g., Seelye & Elder, supra note __ (quoting Rep. Marilyn Musgrave, sponsor of a 
constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage, criticizing “activist judges” and observing that “if 
the definition of marriage is to be changed, it should be done by the American people, not four 
judges in Massachusetts”); Bumiller, supra note __ (quoting President Bush defending a federal 
marriage amendment as necessary because of “activist judges” redefining marriage); Lisa 
Schiffren, How the Judges Forced the President’s Hand, New York Times, Feb. 29, 2004, § 4, 
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with other gay-rights reforms such as decriminalization of same-sex sodomy or the expansion of 
antidiscrimination laws to cover sexual orientation, where legislatures have been the driving 
force.  Moreover, because the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the federal constitution may place 
other states under some obligation to respect Massachusetts marriages, critics of Goodridge can 
rally support for a federal constitutional amendment to protect the rest of the nation from the 
“activist judges” of Massachusetts.
176  To be sure, in light of the Defense of Marriage Act passed 
by Congress in 1996, Goodridge probably would not have binding effect outside of 
Massachusetts even without such an amendment.  But the ability of critics to rally support for a 
federal amendment may depend less on the reality of Goodridge’s extraterritorial effect than on 
the perception that it might have such consequences; critics can sow doubts as to how “activist 
judges” might interpret the Defense of Marriage Act.
177
p.13 (arguing that “four Massachusetts judges, looking to bring about radical social change from 
the bench decided that their commonwealth must begin performing same-sex marriages” and that 
“[w]hether you favor gay marriage or not, it should be a concern when judges . . . decide to 
circumvent the democratic process on a core issue”).  
176 See, e.g., Dao, supra note __ (noting a Georgia legislator emphasizing the need for a 
state constitutional amendment forbidding same-sex marriage because of “activist judges”). 
177 Bumiller, supra note __ (quoting President Bush warning that the Defense of Marriage 
Act might itself be struck down by “activist courts”); Pam Belluch, Massachusetts Gives New 
Push to Gay Marriage in Strong Ruling, New York Times, Fe b. 5, 2004 (noting Tony Perkins, 
president of the Family Research Council, warning, “If same-sex couples ‘marry’ in 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press52
Third and perhaps most important, court decisions produce backlashes by commanding 
that social reform take place in a different order than might otherwise have occurred.  As we 
have seen, by the early 1950s, many southern cities had relaxed Jim Crow in public 
transportation, police department employment, athletic competition, and voter registration.
178
Yet white southerners were more intensely committed to preserving school segregation.  Blacks, 
conversely, were often more interested in voting and receiving a fair share of public education 
funds than in desegregating grade schools.  These partially inverse hierarchies of preference 
among whites and blacks opened space for political negotiation.  Before Brown, many politicians 
in the South had built successful careers by supporting populist economic policies while quietly 
backing gradual racial reform.
179 Brown made that approach untenable by forcing to the 
forefront an issue–racial segregation of public schools–on which most white southerners were 
Massachusetts and move to other states, the Defense of Marriage Act will be left vulnerable to 
the same federal courts that have banned the Pledge of Allegiance and sanctioned partial-birth 
abortion”); see also Schiffren, supra note __ (warning that “[u]ndoubtedly, there are more judges 
across the country waiting for their chance to be creative, too”).  
178 See supra __. 
179 See Numan V. Bartley & Hugh D. Graham, Southern Politics and the Second 
Reconstruction Bartley & Graham, Southern Politics 25, 33-37, 50 (1975); Earl Black, Southern 
Governors and Civil Rights: Racial Segregation as a Campaign Issue in the Second 
Reconstruction 29-31, 37-39, 41-45 (1976);
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unwilling to compromise.  Brown thus virtually ensured a backlash among southern whites.
180
Goodridge is currently producing a political backlash for the same reason.  By the early 
twenty-first century, most Americans were willing to accept decriminalization of same-sex 
sodomy, statutory bans on employment discrimination based on sexual orientation, and perhaps 
even civil unions for same-sex couples.
181  Before Lawrence gave gay marriage especial 
prominence, and before the Massachusetts Supreme Court demonstrated how far courts might go 
on the issue, many Democratic politicians–including most of those competing for the party’s 
presidential nomination in 2004–supported civil unions, but not formal marriage, for gays and 
lesbians.
182  This compromise position was an effort to appeal to homosexual voters, who 
180 For this paragraph, see Klarman, supra note __, at 391-92 (citing relevant sources). 
181 NPR, supra note __ (noting that at the end of 2003, Americans opposed civil unions 
by only 49 percent to 42 percent);  ibid. (noting Democratic pollster Stan Greenberg observing 
that on the issues of partnership rights and civil unions, the country has evolved “over time pretty 
rapidly”); Gallup Poll, May 15, 2003 (noting that Americans by 62 percent to 35 percent favor 
the same legal rights to health care benefits and Social Security survivor benefits for same-sex as 
for married couples); Newsweek, Apr. 27, 2002 (poll showing that Americans by 85 percent to 10 
percent favor equal employment opportunities regardless of sexual orientation). 
182 See, e.g., NPR, supra note __ (noting that major Democratic candidates for president 
opposed by marriage but support civil unions); NPR, Gay Marriage and Civil Unions, supra 
(noting in December 2003 that Democratic voters in an opinion poll favored civil unions by 55% 
to 40% while Republicans opposed by 63% to 27%); Belluck, supra note __ (noting that many 
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disproportionately support the Democratic Party, without alienating those heterosexuals who are 
willing to countenance progressive change on issues involving sexual orientation but not same-
sex marriage.
183  But Goodridge effectively rules out such a compromise by constitutionally 
mandating that same-sex couples be allowed to marry–a position that has not carried the day in 
the popularly elected branches of a single state government and that opinion polls show is 
rejected by majorities of roughly two to one.
184  That decision promises to be a godsend to social 
conservatives and Republicans in the same way that Brown proved a boon to such white-
supremacist politicians as Bull Connor and George Wallace.
185  Although many liberal 
Massachusetts legislators “had supported civil unions but not gay marriage and were hoping the 
court would not force them to make an all-or-nothing decision”).  
183 See Vincent, supra note __ (noting that “Democratic presidential hopefuls . . . are 
trying to preserve their political liberal base by expressing support for Goodridge while straining 
not to alienate centrists in the general election with a wholesale endorsement of what remains a 
radical notion”).
184 Bumiller, supra note __ (noting an opinion polls taken on February 16-17, 2004 
revealing 64 percent opposing same-sex marriage); Seelye & Edler, supra note __ (noting 
another poll showing that respondents oppose same-sex marriage by 61 percent to 34 percent).
185 See, e.g., NPR, supra (quoting Democratic pollster Stan Greenberg to the effect that 
same-sex marriage “has the potential to be a wedge issue [with] . . . greater risk for the 
Democrats”); Robin Toner, Same-Sex Marriage, New York Times, Feb. 25, 2004, p. A1 
(quoting conservative leader Gary Bauer to the effect that on the gay-marriage issue, “[t]he 
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Democrats support same-sex marriage, other traditionally Democratic constituencies–African-
Americans, the elderly, the working-class–generally do not.
186  Opinion polls show that 
respondents are much more likely to vote for President Bush than the nominee of the Democratic 
Party after being told of their respective positions on same-sex marriage and civil unions.
187
Polls also reveal that when people listen to a Democratic statement of support for civil unions 
and a Republican statement of opposition to same-sex marriage, they overwhelmingly favor the 
latter position, which suggests that the Democrats’ preferred strategy of focusing attention on 
public overwhelmingly embraces . . . the conservative side”); Andrew Jacobs, Black Legislators 
Stall Marriage Amendment in Georgia, New York Times, March 3, 2004 (reporting that leaders 
of the Georgia Legislative Black Caucus are predicting that if a state constitutional amendment 
barring same-sex marriage gets on the ballot this fall, Republicans may take over the lower house 
of the state legislature); Rosen, supra note __ (“If any single Supreme Court decision can 
reinvigorate the culture wars today, conservatives say, the court has just handed it to them on a 
silver platter”). 
186 See, e.g., Editorial, State of the Union, Economist, Nov. 22, 2003 (noting that same-
sex marriage “could provide Republicans with a powerful lever to pry away working-class voters 
[who tend to be more culturally conservative] from the Democratic cause”). 
187 See NPR, Gay Marriage and Civil Unions, supra (noting that respondents favor Bush 
over the Democratic nominee by 46 percent to 42 percent before being informed of their 
respective positions on civil unions and by 51 percent to 35 percent after).
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civil unions may not succeed.
188
Decisions such as Brown and Goodridge not only mandate change in the abstract, but 
they inspire activists to take concrete steps to implement them, thus further inciting political 
backlash.  After both Brown rulings, the NAACP urged southern blacks to petition school boards 
for immediate desegregation on threat of litigation.  Blacks filed such petitions in hundreds of 
southern localities, including in the Deep South.  In a few cities, such as Baton Rouge and 
Montgomery, blacks even showed up in person to try to register their children at white schools. 
In the mid-1950s, but for Brown, such challenges would have been inconceivable in the Deep 
South, where race relations had been least affected by broad forces for racial change.  One might 
have predicted that a campaign for racial reform there would have begun with voting rights or 
equalization of black schools, not with school desegregation, which was hardly the top priority of 
most blacks and was more likely to incite violent white resistance.  Merely signing one’s name to 
a school desegregation petition was an act of courage for blacks in the Deep South, and it 
frequently incited economic reprisals and occasionally physical violence.  The petition campaign 
contributed significantly to the rise of massive resistance in the mid-1950s; black efforts to 
implement Brown stimulated more resistance than did the decision itself.
189  As the Jackson 
Daily News editorialized, “there is only one way to meet the attack of the NAACP.  Organized 
188 Id. (noting that respondents by 55 percent to 33 percent identified more closely with 
the Republican’s statement in opposition to same-sex marriage than with the Democratic 
statement in support of civil unions). 
189 For this paragraph, see Klarman, supra note __, at 368-69 (citing relevant sources).
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aggression must be met by organized resistance.”
190
Goodridge is having a similar effect today.  Inspired by the ruling of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court, thousands of same-sex couples have applied for marriage licenses in San 
Francisco and smaller numbers in New Mexico; New Paltz, New York; Asbury Park, New 
Jersey; and Multnomah County, Oregon (which includes Portland).
191  More than 170 gays and 
lesbians have joined a lawsuit in Florida challenging the law prohibiting same-sex marriages,
192
and in New York City, same-sex couples have begun filing for marriage licenses at city hall.
193
By making concrete the threat that same-sex marriage would expand beyond the boundaries of 
Massachusetts, these groups have rallied opponents of same-sex marriage to mobilize behind 
190 Quoted in Report of Secretary to NAACP Board of Directors, Sept. 1955, p. 5, 
NAACP Papers, part 1, reel 2, frame 786.
191 See, e.g., Dean E. Murphy, Groups Ask California Supreme Court to Halt San 
Francisco Same-Sex Marriages, New York Times, Feb. 26, 2004; Thomas Crampton, Despite 
Charges, Mayor Pledges to Keep Marrying Gay Couples, New York Times, March 4, 2004, 
p.A29; Matthew Preusch, Oregon County, with Portland, Offers Same-Sex Marriages, New 
York Times, March 4, 2004, p.A22; Thomas Crampton, Issuing Licenses, Without Pomp in New 
Jersey, New York Times, March 10, 2004, p.A24. 
192 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note __. 
193 Robert D. McFadden, With Polite Refusal, Same-Sex Marriage Issue Reaches City 
Hall, New York Times, March 5, 2004, p.A19.
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state and federal constitutional amendments to limit marriage to unions between men and 
women.
194  But for Goodridge, such measures almost certainly would not be receiving the 
consideration that they are today.
195
Thus, the most significant short-term consequence of Goodridge, as with Brown, may be 
the political backlash that it inspires.
196  By outpacing public opinion on issues of social reform, 
such rulings mobilize opponents, undercut moderates, and retard the cause they purport to 
advance.  And while the violent southern backlash produced by Brown generated a 
194 See, e.g., Dao, supra __ (noting that nearly two-dozen state legislatures are 
considering constitutional amendments forbidding same-sex marriage and that the granting of 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples in San Francisco is inspiring much of this activity); id. 
(Noting a conservative opponent of gay marriage making the point that “social conservatives had 
been particularly energized by the spectacle of San Francisco officials granting marriage licenses 
to gay couples”). 
195 Cloud, supra note __ (noting little conservative interest until very recently in a federal 
constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage).
196 See Jeff Rosen, Immodest Proposal: Massachusetts Gets it Wrong on Gay Marriage, 
New Republic, Dec. 22, 2003 (“By trying to impose gay marriage by judicial fiat, the 
Massachusetts court may set back the cause of gay and lesbian equality rather than advance it.”); 
Stuart Taylor, Jr., Gay Marriage Isn’t An Issue for the Courts to Decide, National Journal, Nov. 
22, 2003 (“The backlash [Goodridge] has provoked could conceivably prove powerful enough to 
set back the gay-rights movement for decades.”).
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counterbacklash in northern opinion, it is unlikely that gays and lesbians will face pervasive 




Brown and Lawrence have another important feature in common: Although on both the 
issues of racial equality and gay rights, public opinion was evenly divided at the time of the 
Court’s ruling, future trends were not difficult to predict.  In the justices’ conference discussion 
of Brown, Stanley Reed predicted that segregation would disappear in the border states within 
fifteen or twenty years, even without judicial intervention.
198  Justice Jackson similarly observed 
that “segregation is nearing an end.”
199  Given the propensity of constitutional law to suppress 
outliers,
200 such a shift in social practices might have ensured an eventual judicial ruling against 
197 But cf. NBC News, Meet the Press (Feb. 22, 2004) (Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger reporting on “riots” in San Francisco over same-sex marriage and predicting, 
“The next thing we know is there are injured or there are dead people. . . .).
198 Douglas conference notes, Brown v. Board of Education, 13 Dec. 1952, case file: 
segregation cases, Box 1150, Douglas Papers.
199 Id. 
200 See Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 
82 Va. L. Rev. 1, 16-17 (1996). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press60
segregation.  A subsequent generation of justices, finding segregation even more abhorrent than 
their predecessors had, would have been sorely tempted to apply an ascendant national norm 
against segregation to shrinking numbers of holdout states.  This is probably what Justice 
Jackson had in mind when he declared in his draft concurring opinion in Brown that “[w]hatever 
we might say today, within a generation [racial segregation] will be outlawed by decision of this 
Court.”
201
The future may be even easier to predict with regard to gay rights.  The demographics of 
public opinion on issues of sexual orientation virtually ensures that one day in the not-too-distant 
future a substantial majority of Americans will support gay marriage.
202  Young people are 
dramatically more likely to support gay rights than are their elders.  One recent poll shows that 
respondents aged 18 to 29 favor legalization of same-sex marriage by 56 percent to 40 percent, 
while those aged 65 and over oppose legalization by 79 percent to 14 percent.  Nor is there 
reason to believe that as people get older, their attitudes on such issues become more 
201 Jackson draft concurrence, supra note __, at 1. 
202 Rosen, supra note __ (noting that “two-thirds of Americans now say they believe that 
same-sex marriage will be legal within the next hundred years”); Frank Rich, And Now, the 
Queer Eye for the Straight Marriage, New York Times, Aug. 10, 2003, p.B1 (noting University 
of Chicago historian George Chauncy confidently predicting “the steady decline in opposition to 
same-sex marriage”); Editorial, Canada’s Celebration of Marriage, New York Times, June 19, 
2003, p.A24 (noting that movements toward accepting same-sex marriage in the United States 
“will be unstoppable in time, whatever the pace proves to be”).
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conservative (unlike attitudes toward wealth redistribution, which do become more conservative 
as people age and acquire more property).  As an older generation holding more traditional views 
about sexual orientation fades from the scene and today’s youth become tomorrow’s 
policymakers, gay marriage will be increasingly accepted.
203  At some point, the Court is likely 
to constitutionalize that new consensus and invalidate statutory bans on same-sex marriage, 
much as the justices struck down restrictions on interracial marriage in Loving v. Virginia (1967), 
after the civil rights movement had made that last formal vestige of Jim Crow seem 
anachronistic.  
To be sure, predicting the future can be fraught with peril.  When the Supreme Court 
invalidated abortion restrictions in Roe v. Wade
204 and cast doubt upon the constitutionality of 
the death penalty in Furman v. Georgia,
205 the justices were probably imagining a future in 
which public opinion would have continued to move in the same direction that the Court was 
pushing.
206  Suffice it to say that on both occasions the justices’ prediction proved mistaken.  
203 See Robin Toner, The Nation: To the Barricades, New York Times, Feb. 29, 2004, § 
4, p.1 (quoting Democratic pollster Anna Greenberg observing, “[I]t’s really likely in 10 or 20 
years that people won’t understand what all the fuss was about.  There’s a whole generation of 
people growing up who just don’t think about these issues in the same way.”). 
204 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
205 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
206 See Dickson, supra note __, at 617 (reproducing the conference notes in Furman v. 
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Over the next three decades, public opinion on abortion changed very little from what it had been 
in 1973.
207  Public opinion on the death penalty shifted quickly and powerfully against the 
Court.
208
Still, some predictions seem safer than others.  The age disparities revealed by public 
opinion polls on issues of sexual orientation are so dramatic that only an unforeseeable event of 
enormous magnitude could disrupt the movement toward greater tolerance. 
Georgia, in which Justice Stewart predicted, “Someday the Court will hold that the death 
sentence is unconstitutional”); Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (observing that 
the death penalty “has for all practical purposes run its course”); John C., Jeffries, Jr., Justice 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 413-14 (1994). 
207 Compare Public Opinion Online, accession # 0380244 (on file with author) (reporting 
a Roper opinion poll from April 2001 revealing that 47 percent of Americans consider 
themselves pro-choice, as opposed to 41 percent who consider themselves pro-life), with id., 
accession # 0045804 (reporting a March 1974 Gallup poll showing that 47 percent of Americans 
supported Roe v. Wade and 44 percent opposed it). 
208 Jeffries, supra note __, at 414 (reporting Gallup polls and concluding that the increase 
in public support for the death penalty after Furman was “so sharp that it seems almost certain to 
have been a negative reaction to the Court’s decision”); Carole S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, 
Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital 
Punishment, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 355, 411-12 (1995) (“[I]t seems fair to say that Furman
galvanized political opposition to abolition”). 
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VII. Conclusion
Supreme Court justices sometimes claim that the Court’s legitimacy derives from its 
ability to demonstrate that its rulings are based on sound legal principles rather than political 
calculations or personal preferences.  In reaffirming the Court’s landmark abortion-rights 
decision, Roe v. Wade, the plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania  v. Casey declared that “the underlying substance of [the Court’s] legitimacy is of 
course the warrant for the Court’s decisions in the Constitution and the lesser sources of legal 
principle on which the Court draws.”
209  Further, the plurality stated, “[A] decision without 
principled justification would be no judicial act at all,”
210 and “[t]he Court must take care to 
speak and act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for 
them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures. . . 
.”
211
In the 1950s, critics assailed Bro wn v. Board of Education as unprincipled judicial 
activism.  Southern whites charged the Court with ignoring precedent, transgressing original 
intent, indulging in sociology, infringing on the reserved rights of states, and usurping legislative 
209 Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
210 Id. 
211 Id. 
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authority.
212  One prominent newspaper editor in the South, James J. Kilpatrick, stated a typical 
view: “[I]n May of 1954, that inept fraternity of politicians and professors known as the United 
States Supreme Court chose to throw away the established law.  These nine men repudiated the 
Constitution, sp[a]t upon the tenth amendment, and rewrote the fundamental law of this land to 
suit their own gauzy concepts of sociology.”
213
White southerners who sympathized with racial segregation were not the only critics of 
Brown.  Some eminent jurists and law professors who condemned white supremacy also attacked 
the Court’s reasoning.  In 1958 Judge Learned Hand stated, “I have never been able to 
understand on what basis it [Brown] does or can rest than as a coup de main,”
214 and the
following year Professor Herbert Wechsler castigated the Court for failing to justify its result in 
Brown on the basis of any “neutral principle.”
215  Indeed, several of the justices themselves 
seemed unconvinced that Brown rested on a sound legal basis.  Justice Jackson, for example, 
conceded that he could not “justify the abolition of segregation as a judicial act,” but he agreed to 
“go along with it” as “a political decision.”
216
212 Klarman, supra note __, at 367-68 (citing relevant sources). 
213 Southern School News , June 1955, p.9.
214 Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights 55 (1958).
215 Wechsler, supra note __, at 32-34.  
216 Burton conference notes, School Segregation Cases, 12 Dec. 1953, Box 244, Burton 
Papers, Library of Congress.
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In the fifty years since it was decided, Brown has become an American icon.  Almost 
everyone regards the decision as right.
217  No constitutional theory is taken seriously unless it can 
accommodate the result in Brown.
218  Aspiring jurists who dared to question the soundness of 
Brown could not possibly survive Senate confirmation hearings.
219  In 1987 Judge Robert Bork 
217 See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note __, at 330 (stating that Brown “is universally approved as 
both right and necessary[;] [m]ore powerful than any academic theory of constitutional 
interpretation is the legend of Brown”).
218 See, e.g., Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 
77 (1990) (stating that “any theory that seeks acceptance must, as a matter of psychological fact, 
if not of logical necessity, account for the result in Brown”); Michael W. McConnell, 
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 Va. L. Re. 947, 952 (1995) (noting that any 
theory unable to accommodate Brown “is seriously discredited”).
219 See, e.g., Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Nomination of William H. Rehnquist to be 
Chief Justice of the United States, S. Exec. Rep. No. 118, 99
th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26 (1986) 
(reproducing 1971 letter from William Rehnquist to Senator James Eastland denying that views 
hostile to the result in Brown expressed in a memorandum he authored as law clerk to Justice 
Jackson during the 1952 term were his own, and stating, “I . . . unequivocally . . . support the 
legal reasoning and the rightness from the standpoint of fundamental fairness of the Brown
decision”). 
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criticized the Court’s sexual-privacy decision, Griswold v. Connecticut,
220 and its landmark 
reapportionment ruling, Reynolds v. Sims,
221 but he emphasized his support for Brown.
222  This 
seismic shift in Brown’s status–from a much-criticized ruling that divided public opinion to a 
sacrosanct decision that is well-nigh universally applauded–may suggest that the Court’s 
legitimacy flows less from the soundness of its legal reasoning than from its ability to predict 
future trends in public opinion. 
Lawrence v. Texas may one day have a similar history.  Contemporary critics of that 
decision have accused the justices of engaging in unprincipled activism, ignoring federalism and 
history, and inventing constitutional rights that have no foundation in the traditional sources of 
constitutional law.
223 Lawrence’s critics sound many of the same notes that Brown’s critics did 
220 Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 116 (1987) 
(“[T]he right of privacy, as defined or undefined by Justice Douglas, was a free-floating right 
that was not derived in a principled fashion from constitutional materials.”)
221 Id. at 157 (“There is nothing in our constitutional history that suggests one man, one 
vote is the only proper way of apportioning. . . . [I]t does not come out of anything in the 
Constitution.”)
222 Id. at 104 (“Brown, delivered with the authority of a unanimous Court, was clearly 
correct and represents perhaps the greatest moral achievement of our constitutional law.”)
223 See, e.g., Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2497 (criticizing the majority for the “invention of a 
http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/uva_publiclaw/art467
fifty years earlier.  Yet, as we have seen, the demographics of public opinion on sexual-
orientation issues suggest dramatic changes in the near future.  Those changes have already been 
sufficient to lead a majority of justices to discard Bowers v. Hardwick.  It may not be too much 
longer before Bowers  comes to resemble  Plessy v. Ferguson,
224 and Lawrence evolves into the 
Brown of the twenty-first century.  Then, the Court’s legitimacy will have been even further 
enhanced by virtue of the justices having rightly predicted the future on another great issue of 
social reform.
brand-new ‘constitutional right’” and subverting the democratic process); Dean E. Murphy, Gays 
Celebrate, and Plan Campaign for Broader Rights, New York Times, June 27, 2003, p.A20 
(quoting Virginia Attorney General Jerry W. Kilgore criticizing Lawrence for undermining the 
states’ “right to pass legislation that reflects the views and values of our citizens”). 
224 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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